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Abstract Constant-time programming is an established discipline to
secure programs against timing attackers. Several real-world secure C
libraries such as NaCl, mbedTLS, or Open Quantum Safe, follow this
discipline. We propose an advanced static analysis, based on state-of-the-
art techniques from abstract interpretation, to report time leakage during
programming. To that purpose, we analyze source C programs and use
full context-sensitive and arithmetic-aware alias analyses to track the
tainted flows.
We give semantic evidences of the correctness of our approach on a core
language. We also present a prototype implementation for C programs
that is based on the CompCert compiler toolchain and its companion
Verasco static analyzer. We present verification results on various real-
world constant-time programs and report on a successful verification of a
challenging SHA-256 implementation that was out of scope of previous
tool-assisted approaches.
1 Introduction
To protect their implementations, cryptographers follow a very strict programming
discipline called constant-time programming. They avoid branchings controlled
by secret data as an attacker could use timing attacks, which are a broad class of
side-channel attacks that measure different execution times of a program in order
to infer some of its secret values [1, 18, 23, 11]. They also avoid memory load/store
indexed by secret data because of cache-timing attacks. Several real-world secure
C libraries such as NaCl [7], mbedTLS [26], or Open Quantum Safe [30], follow
this programming discipline.
The constant-time programming discipline requires to transform programs.
These transformations may be tricky and error-prone, mainly because they involve
low-level features of C and non-standard operations (e.g. bit-level manipulations).
We argue that programmers need tool assistance to use this programming disci-
pline. First, they need feedback at the source level during programming, in order
to verify that their implementation is constant time and also to understand why
a given implementation is not constant time as expected. Moreover, they need
to trust that their compiler will not break source security when translating the
guarantees obtained at the source level. Indeed, compiler optimizations could
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interfere with the previous constant-time transformations performed by the pro-
grammer. In this paper, we choose to implement static analysis at source level
to simplify error reporting, but couple the analyzer to the highly trustworthy
CompCert compiler [25]. This strategic design choice allows us to take advantage
of static analysis techniques that would be hard to apply at lowest program
representation levels.
Static analysis is frequently used for identifying security vulnerabilities in
software, for instance to detect security violations pertaining to information
flow [15, 21, 34]. In this paper, we propose an advanced static analysis, based on
state-of-the-art techniques from abstract interpretation [12] (mainly fixpoint iter-
ations operating over source programs, use of widening operators, computations
performed by several abstract domains including a memory abstract domain
handling pointer arithmetic), to report time leakage during programming.
Data originating from a statement where information may leak is tainted
with the lowest security level. Our static analysis uses two security levels, that
we call secret (high level) and public (low level); it analyzes source C programs
and uses full context-sensitive (i.e., the static analysis distinguishes the different
invocations of a same function) and arithmetic-aware alias analyses (i.e., the cells
of an array are individually analyzed, even if they are accessed using pointer
dereferencing and pointer arithmetic) to track the tainted flows.
We follow the abstract interpretation methodology: we design an abstract
interpreter that executes over security properties instead of concrete values, and
use approximation of program executions to perform fixpoint computations. We
hence leverage the inference capabilities of advanced abstract interpretation
techniques as relational numeric abstractions [28], abstract domain collabora-
tions [19], arithmetic-aware alias analysis [27, 9], to build a very precise taint
analysis on C programs. As a consequence, even if a program uses a same memory
block to store both secret and public values during computations, our analysis
should be able to track it, without generating too many spurious false alarms.
This programming pattern appears in real-world implementations, such as the
SHA-256 implementation in NaCl that we are able to analyze.
In this paper, we make the following contributions:
– We define a new methodology for verifying constant-time security of C
programs. Our static analysis is fully automatic and sound by construction.
– We instrument our approach in the Verasco static analyzer [22]. Verasco is a
formally-verified static analyzer, that is connected to the formally-verified
CompCert C compiler. We thus benefit from the CompCert correctness
theorem, stating roughly that a compiled program behaves as prescribed by
the semantics of its source program.
– We report our results obtained from a benchmark of representative crypto-
graphic programs that are known to be constant time. Thanks to the precision
of our static analyzer, we are able to analyze programs that are out of reach
of state-of-the-art tools.
This paper is organized as follows. First, Section 2 presents the Verasco static
analyzer. Then, Section 3 explains our methodology and details our abstract
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interpreter. Section 4 describes the experimental evaluation of our static analyzer.
Related work is described in Section 5, followed by conclusions.
2 The Verasco Abstract Interpreter
Verasco is a static analyzer based on abstract interpretation that is formally
verified in Coq [22]. Its proof of correctness ensures the absence of runtime errors
(such as out-of-bound array accesses, null pointer dereference, and arithmetic
exceptions) in the analyzed C programs. Verasco relies on several abstract domains,
including a memory domain that finely tracks properties related to memory
contents, taking into account type conversions and pointer arithmetic [9].
Verasco is connected to the CompCert formally-verified C compiler, that is also
formally verified in Coq [25]. Its correctness theorem is a semantics preservation
theorem; it states that the compilation does not introduce bugs in compiled
programs. More precisely, Verasco operates over C#minor, a C-like language that
is the second intermediate language in the CompCert compilation pipeline.
Verasco raises an alarm as soon as it detects a potential runtime error. Its
correctness theorem states that if Verasco returns no alarm, then the analyzed
program is safe (i.e., none of its observable behaviors is an undefined behavior,
according to the C#minor semantics). The design of Verasco is inspired by
Astrée [8], a milestone analyzer that was able to successfully analyze realistic
safety-critical software systems for aviation and space flights. Verasco follows a
similar modular architecture as Astrée, that is shown in Figure 1.
First, at the bottom of the figure, a large hub of numerical abstract domains
is provided to infer numerical invariants on programs. These properties can
be relational as for example j + 1 ≤ i ≤ j + 2 in a loop (with Octagons or
Polyhedra abstract domains). All these domains finely analyze the behavior of
machine integers and floating-points (with potential overflows) while unsound
analyzers would assume ideal arithmetic. They are connected all-together via
communication channels that allow each domain to improve its own precision
via specific queries to other domains. As a consequence, Verasco is able to
infer subtle numerical invariants that require complex reasoning about linear
arithmetic, congruence and symbolic equalities.
Second, on top of these numerical abstractions sits an abstract memory func-
tor [9] that tracks fine-grained aliases and interacts with the numerical domains.
This functor can choose to represent each cell of a same memory block with a
single property, or to finely track each specific property of every position in the
block. Contrary to many other alias analyses, this approach allows us to reason on
local and global variables with the same level of precision, even when the memory
addresses are manipulated by the programmer. Some unavoidable approximations
are performed when the target of a memory dereference corresponds to several
possible targets, but Verasco makes the impact of such imprecision as limited as
possible. Because of ubiquitous pointer arithmetic in C programs (even simple
array accesses are represented via pointer arithmetic in C semantics), the functor
needs to ask advanced symbolic numerical queries to the abstract numerical
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domain below it. In return, its role is to hide the load and store operations from
them, and only communicate via symbolic numerical variables.
Third, the last piece of the analyzer is an advanced abstract interpreter
that builds a fixpoint for the analysis result. This task is a bit more complex
than in standard dataflow analysis techniques that look for the least solution
of dataflow equation systems. In such settings, each equation is defined by
means of monotone operators in a well chosen lattice without infinite ascending
chains. By computing the successive iterates of the transfer functions attached
to each equations, starting from a bottom element, the fixpoint computation
always terminates on the least element of the lattice that satisfies all equations.
In contrast, the Verasco abstract interpreter relies on infinite lattices, where
widening and narrowing operators [12] are used for ensuring and accelerating the
convergence. Smart iteration strategies are crucial when using such accelerating
operators because they directly impact the precision of the analysis diagnosis.
Verasco builds its strategy by following the structure of the program. On every
program loop, it builds a local fixpoint using accelerating techniques. At every
function call, it makes a recursive call of the abstract interpreter on the body of
the callee. The callee may be resolved thanks to the state abstraction functor in
presence of function pointers. The recursive nature of the abstract interpreter
makes the analysis very precise because each function is independently analyzed

















Figure 1: Architecture of the Verasco static analyzer
Furthermore, C#minor is classically structured in functions, statements, and
expressions. Expressions have no side effects; they include reading temporary
variables (which do not reside in memory), taking the address of a non-temporary
variable, constants, arithmetic operations, and dereferencing addresses. The
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arithmetic, logical, comparison, and conversion operators are roughly those of C,
but without overloading: for example, distinct operators are provided for integer
multiplication and floating-point multiplication. Likewise, there are no implicit
casts: all conversions between numerical types are explicit. Statements offer both
structured control and goto with labels. C loops as well as break and continue
statements are encoded as infinite loops with a multi-level exit n that jumps to
the end of the (n+ 1)-th enclosing block.
3 Verifying Constant-Time Security
Our static analyzer operates over C#minor programs. In this paper, we use a
simpler While toy-language for clarity. It is defined in the first part of this section.
Then, we detail our model for constant-time leakage, and explain the tainting
semantics we have defined to track data dependencies in programs. Last, we
explain the main algorithm of our static analyzer.
3.1 The While Language
Our While language is classically structured in statements and expressions,
as shown in Figure 2. Expressions include constants, addresses of variables,
arithmetic operations and dereferencing addresses, so as to model pointer aliasing.
Statements include skip statements, stores, sequences, if and while statements.
Expressions: e ::= n | x | e1 ⊕ e2 | ∗e
Statements: p ::= skip | e1 = e2 | p1;p2 | if e then p1 else p2 | while e do p
Figure 2: Syntax of While programs
The semantics of While is defined in Figure 3 using a small-step style, sup-
porting the reasoning on nonterminating programs. Contrary to the C language,
the semantics is deterministic (and so is the semantics of C#minor). Given a
semantic state σ, an expression e evaluates (big-step style) in a value v (written
〈σ, e〉 → v); the execution of a statement s results in an updated state σ′ and
a new statement to execute s′ (written 〈σ, s〉 → 〈σ′, s′〉). The semantic state σ
maps memory locations (pairs l = (x, n) made of an address and an offset from
this address) to values. Values can either be locations or constants, and we write
σ(e) to denote the value of expression e in state σ (i.e. 〈σ, e〉 → σ(e)).
The reflexive transitive closure of this small-step semantics represents the
execution of a program. When the program terminates (resp. diverges, e.g. when
an infinite loop is executed), it is a finite (resp. infinite) execution of steps. The
execution of a program is safe iff either the program diverges, or the program
terminates (i.e., its final semantic state is 〈σ, skip〉, meaning that there is no
more statement to execute). The execution of a program is stuck (on 〈σ, s〉) when
s differs from skip and no semantic rule can be applied.
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〈σ, n〉 → n 〈σ, x〉 → (x, 0)
〈σ, e1〉 → l σ(l) = v
〈σ, ∗e1〉 → v
〈σ, e1〉 → v1 〈σ, e2〉 → v2
〈σ, e1 ⊕ e2〉 → v1 ⊕ v2
〈σ, e1〉 → l 〈σ, e2〉 → n
〈σ, e1 = e2〉 → 〈σ[l 7→ n], skip〉
〈σ, skip; p〉 → 〈σ, p〉
〈σ, p1〉 → 〈σ′, p′1〉
〈σ, p1; p2〉 → 〈σ′, p′1; p2〉
〈σ, e〉 → true
〈σ, if e then p1 else p2〉 → 〈σ, p1〉
〈σ, e〉 → false
〈σ, if e then p1 else p2〉 → 〈σ, p2〉
〈σ, e〉 → true
〈σ, while e do p〉 → 〈σ, p; while e do p〉
〈σ, e〉 → false
〈σ, while e do p〉 → 〈σ, skip〉
Figure 3: Semantics of While programs
3.2 Constant-Time Security
In our model, we assume that branching statements and memory accesses may
leak information through their execution. We use a similar definition of constant-
time security to the one given in [2]. We define a leakage model L as a map from
semantic states 〈σ, p〉 to sequences of observations L(〈σ, p〉) with ε being the
empty observation. Two executions are said to be indistinguishable when their
observations are the same:
L(〈σ0, p0〉) · L(〈σ1, p1〉) · . . . = L(〈σ′0, p′0〉) · L(〈σ′1, p′1〉) · . . . .
Definition 1 (Constant-time leakage model). Our leakage model is such
that the three following equalities hold, where ∗e′0, . . . ∗ e′n are the read memory
accesses appearing respectively in expressions e in the first line, e in the second
line, e1 and e2 in the third line.
1. L(〈σ, if e then p1 else p2〉) = σ(e)σ(e′0) . . . σ(e′n)
2. L(〈σ, while e do p〉) = σ(e)σ(e′0) . . . σ(e′n)
3. L(〈σ, e1 = e2〉) = σ(e1)σ(e′0) . . . σ(e′n)
The first and second lines mean that the value of branching conditions is considered
as leaked. The last line means that the address of a store access is also considered
as leaked. Additionally, all locations of read accesses are also considered as leaked.
Given this leakage model, two indistinguishable executions of a program must
necessarily have the same control flow. Moreover, one execution cannot be stuck
while the other can continue execution. Indeed, in our While language, the only
way to have a stuck execution is either to try to dereference a value that is
not a valid location (a constant or an out-of-range location), or to write in a
constant value or to branch on a non-boolean value. However, by definition of
Verifying Constant-Time Implementations by Abstract Interpretation 7
indistinguishability and the leakage model, these values must be the same in
both executions, thus both executions have the same control flow.
Given a program, we assume that the attacker has access to the values of
some of its inputs, which we call the public input variables, and does not have
access of the other ones, which we call the secret input variables.
Definition 2 (Constant-time security). A program p0 is constant time if
for any set Xi of public input variables such that for all pair of safe executions
〈σ0, p0〉 → 〈σ1, p1〉 → . . . and 〈σ′0, p0〉 → 〈σ′1, p′1〉 → . . . such that both states
share the same public values (i.e., ∀x ∈ Xi, i ∈ N, σ0(x, i) = σ′0(x, i)), then both
executions are indistinguishable.
This definition means that a constant-time program is such that, any pair of its
executions that only differ on its secrets must leak the exact same information.
This also gives a definition of constant-time security for infinite execution.
3.3 Reducing Security to Safety
We introduce an intermediate tainting semantics for While programs in Figure 4,
and use the  symbol to distinguish its executions from those of the original
semantics. The tainting semantics is an instrumentation of the While semantics
that tracks dependencies. In the tainted semantics, a program gets stuck if
branchings or memory accesses depend on secrets. We introduce taints, either
High or Low to respectively represent secret and public values and a union
operator on taints defined as follows: Low t Low = Low and ∀ t, High t t =
t t High = High; it is used to compute the taint of a binary expression. In
the instrumented semantics, we take into account taints in semantic values: the
semantic state σ becomes a tainted state στ , where locations are now mapped to
pairs made of a value and a taint.
Let us note that for a dereferencing expression ∗e1 to have a value, the taint
associated to e1 must be Low. Indeed, we forbid memory read accesses that might
leak secret values. This concerns dereferencing expressions (loads) and assignment
statements (store of a lvalue). Similarly, test conditions in branching statements
must also have a Low taint.
The instrumented semantics preserves the regular behavior of programs
(defined in Figure 3), as stated by the following theorem, which can be proven by
induction on the execution relation.
Theorem 1. Any safe execution 〈στ0, p0〉  〈στ1, p1〉  . . . of program p0 in
the tainting semantics implies that the execution 〈σ0, p0〉 → 〈σ1, p1〉 → . . . is
also safe in the regular semantics. Here, for all k, σk is a semantic state such
that for all location l where στk is defined, there exists a taint tk such that
στk(l) = (σk(l), tk). As an immediate corollary, any safe program according to
the tainting semantics is also safe according to the regular semantics.
Theorem 1 is useful to prove our main theorem relating our instrumented
semantics and the constant-time property we want to verify on programs.
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〈στ , n〉 (n, Low) 〈στ , x〉 ((x, 0), Low)
〈στ , e1〉 (l, Low) στ (l) = (v, t)
〈στ , ∗e1〉 (v, t)
〈στ , e1〉 (v1, t1) 〈στ , e2〉 (v2, t2)
〈στ , e1 ⊕ e2〉 (v1 ⊕ v2, t1 t t2)
〈στ , e1〉 (l, Low) 〈στ , e2〉 (n, t)
〈στ , e1 = e2〉 〈στ [l 7→ (n, t)], skip〉
〈στ , skip; p〉 〈στ , p〉
〈στ , p1〉 〈σ′τ , p′1〉
〈στ , p1; p2〉 〈σ′τ , p′1; p2〉
〈στ , e〉 (true, Low)
〈στ , if e then p1 else p2〉 〈στ , p1〉
〈στ , e〉 (false, Low)
〈στ , if e then p1 else p2〉 〈στ , p2〉
〈στ , e〉 (true, Low)
〈στ , while e do p〉 〈στ , p; while e do p〉
〈στ , e〉 (false, Low)
〈στ , while e do p〉 〈στ , skip〉
Figure 4: Tainting semantics for While programs
Theorem 2. Any safe program w.r.t. the tainting semantics is constant time.
Proof. Let p0 be a safe program with respect to the tainting semantics. Let Xi
be a set of public variables and let 〈σ0, p0〉 → 〈σ1, p1〉 → . . . and 〈σ′0, p0〉 →
〈σ′1, p′1〉 → . . . be two safe executions of p0 such that for all x ∈ Xi and n ∈ N,
we have σ0(x, n) = σ′0(x, n).
We now need to prove that both executions are indistinguishable. Let στ0
be such that for all x ∈ Xi, n ∈ N, στ0(x, n) = (σ0(x, n), Low) and also for all
x /∈ Xi, n ∈ N, στ0(x, n) = (σ0(x, n), High).
By safety of program p0 according to the tainting semantics, there exists some
states στ1, στ2, . . . such that 〈στ0, p0〉 〈στ1, p1〉 . . . is a safe execution. Let
σn′ be such that there exists for all location l, a taint t′n such that, στn(l) =
(σn′(l), t
′
n). We prove by strong induction on n that σn′ = σn.
– It is clearly true for n = 0 by definition of στ0.
– Suppose it is true for all k < n and let us prove it for n. By using theorem 1,
we know that there exists a safe execution 〈σ0, p0〉 → 〈σ1′ , p1′〉 → . . . →
〈σn′ , pn′〉 → . . .. Furthermore, the semantics is deterministic and we know
that 〈σ0, p0〉 → 〈σ1, p1〉 → . . .. Therefore, we have the following series of
equalities: σ1′ = σ1, p1′ = p1, . . . σn′ = σn, pn′ = pn.
Thus, for all k ∈ N, the state στk verifies that for all l, there exists tk such
that στk(l) = (σk(l), tk). Similarly, we define σ′τ0, σ′τ1, . . . for the second execution
which also verifies the same property by construction.
Finally, we need to prove that for all n ∈ N, L(〈σn, pn〉) = L(〈σ′n, p′n〉). First,
we define the notation σn =L σ′n for all n ∈ N, meaning that for all l, στn(l) =
(σn(l), Low) iff σ′τn(l) = (σ′n(l), Low) and σn(l) = σ′n(l). Both environments must
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agree on locations with Low taints. For all n ∈ N, let us prove by induction on pn
that if pn = p′n and σn =L σ′n, then pn+1 = p′n+1 and σn+1 =L σ′n+1.




– if pn = p; p′, it is true by induction hypothesis.
– if pn = if e . . . or pn = while e . . ., we have σn+1 = σn and σ′n+1 = σ′n.
Furthermore, we know that there exists some v such that 〈στn, e〉 (v, Low)
and similarly, there exists v′ such that 〈σ′τn, e〉  (v′, Low) because of the
safety in the tainting semantics. Since σn(e) = v, σ′n(e) = v′ and σn =L σ′n,
we have v = v′ and thus pn+1 = p′n+1.
– if pn = e1 = e2, we have pn+1 = p′n+1 = skip. By using the same reasoning
as the previous case, we can prove that σn(e1) = σ′n(e1) = l. There exists
v, v′, t, t′ such that 〈στn, e2〉  (v, t) and 〈σ′τn, e2〉  (v′, t′) and thus
σn+1 = σn[l 7→ v] and σ′n+1 = σn[l 7→ v′]. If t = t′ = Low, then v = v′ and
σn+1 =L σ
′
n+1. If t = t′ = High, then σn+1 =L σ′n+1 by definition. Without
loss of generality, we can consider that t = Low and t′ = High. e2 must
necessarily contain a memory read ∗e3 such that 〈σ′τn, ∗e3〉  (v3, High)




′. So, στn(l′) must have High taint by definition of
σn =L σ
′
n, which is absurd.
Finally, by exploiting this lemma, a simple induction proves that for all n ∈ N,
pn = p
′
n and σn =L σ′n. Furthermore, a direct consequence is that for all n ∈ N,
L(〈σn, pn〉) = L(〈σ′n, p′n〉).
3.4 Abstract Interpreter
To prove that a program is safe according to the tainting semantics, we design a
static analyzer based on abstract interpretation. It computes a correct approxima-
tion of the execution the analyzed program, thus if the approximative execution
is safe, then the actual execution must necessarily be safe.
As our actual implementation takes advantage of the Verasco static ana-
lyzer, we reuse its memory abstraction M#. It provides target#, assert# and
assign# operators working as follows. Given an abstract environment σ# and
an expression e, target#(e, σ#) returns a list of locations l1, . . . ln corresponding
to the locations that are represented by e. It returns ⊥# if e cannot be evaluated
to a location. Second, suppose that we have an if statement with condition
(∗x < 5) and the abstract environment only knows that location (x, 0) has its
value in [0, 42]. The analysis can gain precision by assuming in the first (resp.
second) branch that location (x, 0) has its value in [0, 4] (resp. [5, 42]). Similarly,
if we know that (x, 0) only has its value between in [−2, 4], we do not need to
analyze the second branch. Thus, given an abstract environment σ# and an
expression e, assert#(e, σ#) returns a modified abstract environment assuming
that e is true; if it is not possible (because e can only evaluate to false in σ#
for example), it returns the error state ⊥#. Third, assign#(e1, e2, σ#) is the
abstract counterpart of e1 = e2.
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Now, for the analysis to track taints, we need an abstraction of taints Taint#
that we define as Low# and High#. We use Low# to indicate that a location
contains a value that has exactly a Low taint and High# to indicate that it may be
Low or High. In order to analyze the following snippet, it is necessary to correctly
approximate the taint that will be assigned to location (x, 0) after execution.
if /* low expr */ x = /* high expr */ else x = /* low expr */
As it can either be Low or High, we use the approximation High#. We could
have used High# to indicate that a location can only have a High value, however
constant-time security is not interested in knowing that value has exactly High
taint, but only in knowing that it may have a High taint.
The analyzer is now given a new mapping τ# that maps locations to abstract
taints. Given σ#, τ# and an expression e, we define a new operator low(e, σ#, τ#)
asserting that e has Low taint and contains only non-secret dependent memory
reads. It is defined recursively as follows. The tricky part is ∗e, where the operator
verifies that e has a low taint to ensure that the memory access is not secret
dependent and then uses targets# to ensure that all possible accessed locations
contain Low values.
– low(n, σ#, τ#) = true and low(x, σ#, τ#) = true




– low(e1 ⊕ e2, σ#, τ#) = low(e1, σ#, τ#) ∧ low(e2, σ#, τ#)
Similarly to low, we define safe(e, σ#, τ#) as asserting that e does not contain
secret dependent memory reads but does not check the taint of e. We also define
taint#(e, σ#, τ#) as the abstract taint of expression e. Moreover, to take account
of taintings, we then define assert#τ and assign#τ as follows.
assert#τ (e, σ
#, τ#) = if low(e, σ#, τ#) then (assert#(e, σ#), τ#) else ⊥#
assign#τ (e1, e2, σ
#, τ#) = if low(e1, σ#, τ#) ∧ safe(e2, σ#, τ#) then
(assign #(e1, e2, σ#),
⊔
li∈targets(e,σ#)
τ#[li 7→ taint#(e, σ#, τ#)]) else ⊥#.
Finally, the abstract analysis JpK(σ#, τ#) of program p starting with abstract
environment σ# and tainting τ# is defined in Figure 5. To analyze (p1; p2),
first p1 is analyzed and then p2 is analyzed using the environment given by the
first analysis. Similarly, to analyze a statement (if e then p1 else p2), p1 is
analyzed assuming that e is true and p2 is analyzed assuming the opposite, t#
is then used to get an over-approximation of both results.
The loop (while e do p) is the trickiest part to analyze, as the analysis
cannot just analyze one iteration of the loop body and then recursively analyze
the loop again since it may never terminate. It thus tries to find a loop invariant.
The standard method in abstract interpretation is to compute a post-fixpoint of
the function iter(e, p, ·) as defined in Figure 5. It represents a loop invariant, the
final result is thus the invariant where the test condition does not hold anymore.
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JskipK#(σ#, τ#) = (σ#, τ#)
Je1 = e2K#(σ#, τ#) = assign#τ (e1, e2, σ
#, τ#)
Jp1; p2K#(σ#, τ#) = Jp2K#(Jp1K#(σ#, τ#))
Jif e then p1 else p2K#(σ#, τ#) = Jp1K#(assert#τ (e, σ
#, τ#)) t#
Jp2K#(assert#τ (not e, σ
#, τ#))
Jwhile e do pK#(σ#, τ#) = assert#τ (not e, pfp(iter(e, p, ·), (σ#, τ#)))
iter(e, p, (σ#, τ#)) = (σ#, τ#) t# assert#τ (e, JpK#(σ#, τ#))
Figure 5: Abstract execution of statements
In order to compute the post-fixpoint, we use pfp(f, x) which computes a post-
fixpoint of monotone function f by successively computing x, f(x), f(f(x)), . . .,
and forces convergence using a widening-narrowing operator on the M# part.
The taint part does not require convergence help because it is a finite lattice.
3.5 Correctness of the Abstract Interpreter
In order to state the correctness of our abstract interpreter, we introduce the
concept of concretization. We use v ∈ γ(v#) to say that v is in the concretization
of abstract value v#, which means that v# represents a set of concrete values of
which v is a member.
The abstract interpreter operates over a product M# × T# of abstract
environments and abstract taintings (maps from location to taints). For σ# ∈M#,
we suppose we already have its concretization γ1(σ#) (as given in [9]). For τ# ∈
T#, we first define the concretization of abstract taints by γτ (Low#) = {Low} and
γτ (High#) = {Low, High}. For all στ , we call σ1τ and σ2τ the two functions such
that for all l, στ (l) = (σ1τ (l), σ2τ (l)). The concretization γ2(τ#) is then defined as
follows.
γ2(τ
#) = {σ2τ |∀l, σ2τ (l) ∈ γτ (τ#(l))}
Finally, for all (σ#, τ#) ∈M# × T#, its concretization γ(σ#, τ#) is defined as
γ(σ#, τ#) = {στ |σ1τ ∈ γ1(σ#) ∧ σ2τ ∈ γ2(τ#)}
The correctness theorem of the abstract interpreter intuitively means that
if the abstract interpreter does not raise an alarm, then the program must be
safe according to the tainting semantics (in which case it is also safe according
to the original semantics, because of theorem 1). The correctness theorem can be
stated as follows.
Theorem 3. For all program p, environment στ and abstract environment σ#τ
such that στ ∈ γ(σ#τ ), if we have the execution 〈στ , p〉  ∗ 〈σ′τ , skip〉, then we
also have σ′τ ∈ γ(JpK#(σ#τ )).
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In order to prove this theorem, we follow the usual methodology in abstract
interpretation and define a collecting semantics, aiming at facilitating the proof.
The semantics (not detailed in the paper) still expresses the dynamic behavior
of programs but takes a closer form to the analysis. It operates over properties
of concrete environments, thus bridging the gap between concrete environments
and abstract environments, which represent sets of concrete environments.
4 Implementation and Experiments
Following the methodology presented in Section 3, we have implemented a
prototype leveraging the Verasco static analyzer. We have been able to evaluate
our prototype by verifying multiple actual C code constant-time algorithms taken
from different cryptographic libraries such as NaCl [7], mbedTLS [26], Open
Quantum Safe [10] and curve25519-donna [16].
In order to use our tool, the user simply has to indicate which variables are
to be considered secrets and the prototype will either raise alarms indicating
where secrets may leak, or indicate that the input program is constant time. The
user can either indicate a whole global variable to be considered as secret at the
start of the program, or uses the verasco_any_int_secret built-in function to
produce a random signed integer to be considered as secret.
4.1 Memory Separation
By leveraging Verasco, the prototype has no problem handling difficult problems
such as memory separation. For example, the small example of Figure 6 is easily
proved as constant time. In this program, an array t is initialized with random
values, such that the values in odd offsets are considered as secrets, contrary to
values in even offsets. So, the analyzer needs to be precise enough to to distinguish
between the array cells and to take into account pointer arithmetic. The potential
leak happens on line 6. However, the condition on line 5 constrains i%2 == 0 to
be true, and thus i must be even on line 6, so t[i] does not contain a secret. A
naive analyzer would taint the whole array as secret and would thus not be able
to prove the program constant-time, however our prototype has no problem to
prove it.
1 int main(void) {
2 int t[4] = { verasco_any_int(), verasco_any_int_secret(),
3 verasco_any_int(), verasco_any_int_secret() };
4 for (int i = 0; i < 4; i++)
5 if (i%2 == 0) { // First if condition
6 if (t[i]) t[i] = 0; } // Second if condition
7 return 0; }
Figure 6: An example program that is analyzed as constant time
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Interestingly, an illustration of the problem can be found in real-world pro-
grams. For example, the NaCl implementation of SHA-256 is not handled by [2]
due to this. Indeed, in this program, the hashing function uses the following C
struct as an internal state that contains both secret and public values during
execution.
typedef struct crypto_hash_sha256_state {
uint32_t state[8];
uint32_t count[2];
unsigned char buf[64]; } crypto_hash_sha256_state;
While field count contains public values, fields state and buf can contain both
public and secret values. Only count is used in possibly leaking operations,
however the whole struct is allocated as a single memory block at low level (i.e.,
LLVM) and [2] does not manage to prove the memory separation.
4.2 Cryptographic Algorithms
We report in Table 1 our results on a set of cryptographic algorithms, all exe-
cutions times reported were obtained on a 3.1GHz Intel i7 with 16GB of RAM.
Sizes are reported in terms of numbers of C#minor statements (i.e., close to
C statements), lines of code are measured with cloc and execution times are
reported in seconds. The first block of lines gathers test cases for the implemen-
Example Size Loc Time
aes 1171 1399 41.39
curve25519-donna 1210 608 586.20
des 229 436 2.28
rlwe_sample 145 1142 30.76
salsa20 341 652 0.04
sha3 531 251 57.62
snow 871 460 3.37
tea 121 109 3.47
nacl_chacha20 384 307 0.34
nacl_sha256 368 287 0.04
nacl_sha512 437 314 1.02
mbedtls_sha1 544 354 0.19
mbedtls_sha256 346 346 0.38
nbedtls_sha512 310 399 0.26
mee-cbc 1959 939 933.37
Table 1: Verification of cryptographic primitives
tations of a representative set of cryptographic primitives including TEA [36],
an implementation of sampling in a discrete Gaussian distribution by Bos et
al. [10] (rlwe_sample) taken from the Open Quantum Safe library [30], an
implementation of elliptic curve arithmetic operations over Curve25519 [6] by
Langley [16](curve25519-donna), and various primitives such as AES, DES, etc.
The second block reports on different implementations from the NaCl library [7].
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The third block reports on implementations from the mbedTLS [26] library.
Finally, the last result corresponds to an implementation of MAC-then-Encode-
then-CBC-Encrypt (MEE-CBC).
All these examples are proven constant time, except for AES and DES. Our
prototype rightfully reports memory accesses depending on secrets, so these two
programs are not constant time. Similarly to [2], rlwe_sample is only proven
constant time, provided that the core random generator is also constant time,
thus showing that it is the only possible source of leakage.
The last example mee-cbc is a full implementation of the MEE-CBC con-
struction using low-level primitives taken from the NaCl library. Our prototype is
able to verify the constant-time property of this example, showing that it scales
to large code bases (939 loc).
Our prototype is able to verify a similar set of programs as [2], except for the
libfixedtimefixedpoint library [3] which unfortunately does not use standard
C and is not handled by CompCert. The library uses extensively a GNU extension
known as statement-expressions and would require heavy rewriting to be accepted
by our tool.
On the other hand, our tool shows its agility with memory separation on
the program SHA-256 that was out of reach for [2] and its restricted alias
management. In terms of analysis time, our tool behaves similarly to [2]. On a
similar experiment platform, we observe a speedup between 0.1 and 10. This is
very encouraging for our tool whose efficiency is still in an upgradeable stage,
compared to the tool of [2] that relies on decades of implementation efforts for
the LLVM optimizer and the Boogie verifier.
5 Related Work
This paper deals with static program verification for information-flow track-
ing [34]. Different formal techniques have been used in this area. The type-based
approach [29] provides an elegant modular verification approach but requires
program annotations, especially for each program function. Because a same
function can be called in very different security contexts, providing an expressive
annotation language is challenging and annotating programs is a difficult task.
This approach has been mainly proposed for programming language with strong
type guarantees such as Java [29] or ML [31]. The deductive approach [14] is
based on more expressive logics than type systems and then allows to express
subtle program invariants. On the other hand, the loop invariant annotation
effort requires strong formal method expertise and is very much time consuming.
The static analysis approach only requires minimal annotation (the input taints)
and then tries to infer all the remaining invariants in the restricted analysis logic.
This approach has been followed to track efficiently implicit flows using program
dependence graphs [20, 33]. We also follow a static approach but our backbone
technique is an advanced value analysis for C, that we use to infer fine-grained
memory separation properties and finely track taints in an unfolded call graph of
the program. Building a program dependence graph for memory is a well known
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challenge and scaling this approach to a Verasco (or Astrée) memory analysis is
left for further work.
This paper deals however with a restricted notion of information flow: constant-
time security. Here, implicit flow tracking is simplified since we must reject3
control-flow branching that depends on secret inputs. Our abstract interpretation
approach proposes to accompany a taint analysis with a powerful value analysis.
The tool tis-ct [35] uses a similar approach but based on the Frama-C value
analysis, instead of Verasco (and its Astrée architecture). The tool is developed by
the TrustInSoft company and not associated with any scientific publication. It has
been used to analyze OpenSSL. Frama-C and Verasco value analysis are based on
different abstract interpretation techniques and thus the tainting power of tis-ct
and our tool will differ. As an example of difference, Verasco provides relational
abstraction of memory contents while tis-ct is restricted to non-relational analysis
(like intervals). CacheAudit [17] is a also based on abstract interpretation but
analyze cache leakage at binary level. Analysing program at this low level tempers
the inference capabilities for memory separation, because the memory is seen
as a single memory block. Verasco benefits from a source level view where each
function has its own region for managing local variables.
In a previous work of the second author [5], C programs where compiled
by CompCert to an abstraction of assembly before being analyzed. A simple
data-flow analysis was then performed, flow insensitive for every memory block
except the memory stack, and constant-time security was verified. The precision
of this approach requires to fully inline the program before analysis. It means
that every function call was replaced by its function body until no more function
call remained. This has serious impact on the efficiency of the analysis and a
program like curve25519-donna was out of reach. The treatment of memory
stack was also very limited since no value analysis was available at this level or
program representation. There was no way to finely taint an array content if
this array laid in the stack (which occurs when C arrays are declared as local
variables). Hence, numerous manual program rewritings were required before
analysis. Our current approach releases these restrictions but requires more trust
on the compiler (see our discussion in the conclusion).
A very complete treatment of constant-time security has been recently pro-
posed by the ct-verif tool [2]. Its verification is based on a reduction of constant
time security of a program P to safety of a product program Q that simulates two
parallel executions of P . The tool is based on the LLVM compiler and operates
at the LLVM bytecode level, after LLVM optimizations and alias analyses. Once
obtained, the bytecode program is transformed into a product program which,
in turn, is verified by the Boogie verifier [4] and its traditional SMT tool suite.
In Section 4, we made a direct experimental comparison with this tool. We list
here the main design differences between this work and ours. First we do not
perform the analysis at a similar program representation. LLVM bytecode is
interesting because one can develop analyses that benefit from the rich collection
3 We could accept some of them if we were able to prove that all branches provide a
similar timing behavior.
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of tools provided by the LLVM platform. For example, [2] benefits from LLVM
data-structure analysis [24] to partition memory objects into disjoint regions.
Still, compiler alias analyses are voluntarily limited because compilers translate
programs in almost linear time. Verasco (and its ancestor Astrée) follows a more
ambitious approach and tracks very finely the content of the memory. Using
Verasco requires a different tool design but opens the door for more verified pro-
grams, as for example the SHA-256 example. Second, we target a more restricted
notion of constant-time security than [2] which relaxes the property with a so-
called notion of publicly observable outputs. The extension is out of scope of our
current approach but seems promising for specific programs. Only one program in
our current experiment is affected by this limitation. At last, we embed our tool
in a more foundational semantic framework. Verasco and CompCert are formally
verified. It leaves the door open for a fully verified constant-time analyzer, while
a fully verified ct-verif tool would require to prove SMT solvers, Boogie verifier
and LLVM. The Vellvm [37] is a first attempt in the direction of verifying the
LLVM platform, but it is currently restricted to a core subset (essentially the SSA
generation) of the LLVM passes, and suffers from time-performance limitations.
Other approaches rely on dynamic analysis (e.g. [13] that extends of Valgrind
in order to check constant-address security) or on statistical analysis of execution
timing [32]. These approaches are not sound.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a methodology to ensure that a software imple-
mentation is constant time. Our methodology is based on advanced abstract
interpretation techniques and scales on commonly used cryptographic libraries.
Our implementation sits in a rich foundational semantic framework, Verasco and
CompCert, which give strong semantic guarantees. The analysis is performed at
source level and can hence give useful feedback to the programmer that needs to
understand why his program is not constant time.
There are two main directions for future work. The first one concerns semantic
soundness. By inspecting CompCert transformation passes, we conjecture that
they preserve the constant-time property of source programs we successfully
analyze. We left as further work a formal proof of this conjecture. The second
direction concerns expressiveness. In order to verify more relaxed properties, we
could try to mix the program-product approach of [2] with the Verasco analysis.
The current loop invariant inference and analysis of [2] are rather restricted.
Using advanced alias analysis and relational numeric analysis could strengthen
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